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Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)

  • Noel Johnson

    ()

  • Courtney LaFountain

    ()

  • Steven Yamarik

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9634-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 147 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 377-393

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:377-393
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2005. "Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-12, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  3. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
  4. Filipe Campante & Davin Chor & Quoc-Anh Do, . "Instability and the Incentives for Corruption," Working Paper 248201, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09.
  6. Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William & Alesina, Alberto, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," Scholarly Articles 4551797, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Kevin Grier, 1989. "Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 201-219, December.
  8. Hausman, Jerry & Stock, James H. & Yogo, Motohiro, 2005. "Asymptotic properties of the Hahn-Hausman test for weak-instruments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 333-342, December.
  9. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
  10. Craig A. Depken II, 1997. "The Effects of Campaign Contribution Sources on the Congressional Elections of 1996," Public Economics 9703003, EconWPA.
  11. N. Gregory Mankiw & David Romer & David N. Weil, 1992. "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 407-437.
  12. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers 97-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  13. Alicia Adsera & Carles Boix & Mark Payne, 2000. "Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government," Research Department Publications 4241, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  14. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284.
  15. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
  16. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "Growth economics and reality," Working papers 24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Philip Shaw & Marina-Selini Katsaiti & Marius Jurgilas, 2006. "Corruption and Growth Under Weak Identification," Working papers 2006-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007.
  18. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
  19. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
  20. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," NBER Working Papers 3530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufman & Andrei Shleifer, 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(2), pages 159-240.
  22. Kocherlakota, Narayana R. & Yi, Kei-Mu, 1995. "Can convergence regressions distinguish between exogenous and endogenous growth models?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-215, August.
  23. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  24. Alicia H. Munnell, 1990. "Why has productivity growth declined? Productivity and public investment," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 3-22.
  25. Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain, 2006. "Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 75-85, January.
  26. Fisman, Raymond & Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? - firm-level evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2485, The World Bank.
  27. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
  28. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  29. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
  30. Andrews, Donald W.K. & Moreira, Marcelo J. & Stock, James H., 2007. "Performance of conditional Wald tests in IV regression with weak instruments," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 116-132, July.
  31. Donald W. K. Andrews & Marcelo J. Moreira & James H. Stock, 2006. "Optimal Two-Sided Invariant Similar Tests for Instrumental Variables Regression," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 715-752, 05.
  32. Levitt, Steven D, 1994. "Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 777-98, August.
  33. Gasper A. Garofalo & Steven Yamarik, 2002. "Regional Convergence: Evidence From A New State-By-State Capital Stock Series," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 316-323, May.
  34. Goel, Rajeev K & Nelson, Michael A, 1998. "Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 107-20, October.
  35. Marcelo J. Moreira, 2003. "A Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test for Structural Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1027-1048, 07.
  36. Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2003. "Bureaucratic corruption, environmental policy and inbound US FDI: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1407-1430, August.
  37. Glaeser, Edward L. & Saks, Raven E., 2006. "Corruption in America," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1053-1072, August.
  38. Stratmann, Thomas, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 127-36, February.
  39. Lott, John R, Jr, 1991. "Does Additional Campaign Spending Really Hurt Incumbents? The Theoretical Importance of Past Investments in Political Brand Name," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 87-92, October.
  40. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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