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Insecure Property and Technological Backwardness

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  • Francisco M. Gonzalez

Abstract

We consider the incentive to adopt superior technologies when private property is insecure. The welfare costs of insecure property can be substantially greater than those commonly associated with diversion and with the disincentive effect induced by imperfect appropriation of returns. When private property is sufficiently insecure, anticipation of conflict over economic distribution gives rise to technological backwardness, even though (1) superior technologies are readily available at zero cost and (2) the "ex post" diversion of resources might be small. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco M. Gonzalez, 2005. "Insecure Property and Technological Backwardness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 703-721, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:505:p:703-721
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    Cited by:

    1. Jennings, Colin & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2017. "Social capital, conflict and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 157-167.
    2. Gonzalez, Francisco M. & Neary, Hugh M., 2008. "Prosperity without conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2170-2181, October.
    3. J. Amegashie, 2011. "Incomplete property rights and overinvestment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 81-95, June.
    4. Rodriguez Acosta, Mauricio, 2016. "Essays in political economy and resource economic : A macroeconomic approach," Other publications TiSEM 1e39ef1b-43a2-4f95-892c-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
    6. Marco Magnani, 2013. "Why do dictators like white elephants? An application of the all-pay auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2260-2269.
    7. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    8. Jose Luis Evia & Roberto Laserna & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Socio-Political Conflict and Eonomic Performance in Bolivia," Working Papers 070814, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    9. Rowthorn, Robert & Seabright, Paul, 2010. "Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition," TSE Working Papers 10-207, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    11. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    12. Andrew J Tiffin, 2006. "Ukraine; The Cost of Weak Institutions," IMF Working Papers 06/167, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Alexander M. Yarkin, 2014. "Endogenous Property Rights, Conflict Intensity And Inequality In Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contest," HSE Working papers WP BRP 72/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    14. Ivan G. Lopez Cruz, 2015. "Policing, Schooling and Human Capital Accumulation," Caepr Working Papers 2015-024 Classification-D, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
    15. Hao Jin & Hewei Shen, 2016. "Foreign Asset Accumulation among Emerging Market Economies: a Case for Coordination," Caepr Working Papers 2016-001 Classification-D, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
    16. repec:elg:eechap:15325_3 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "An economic approach to analyzing civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
    18. Indranil Dutta & Paul Madden & Ajit Mishra, 2014. "Group Inequality and Conflict," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 257-283, June.
    19. Matthew Baker & Erwin Bulte, 2010. "Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 207-227, June.
    20. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
    21. Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
    22. Daniel Leonard & Ngo Van Long, 2012. "Endogenous Changes in Property Rights Regime," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(280), pages 79-88, March.
    23. Jonathan J Adams, 2017. "The Rise and Fall of Armies," Working Papers 001002, University of Florida, Department of Economics.

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