IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Did pre-WTO agreements curb corruption?

Listed author(s):
  • Mukherjee, Deepraj

Using country-level panel data, this study tests whether a country’s decision to join a preferential trade agreement (PTA) or existing participation in one affects its corruption levels. The sample for this study pertains mostly to first-generation PTAs that arose prior to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The results suggest that member nations that entered into pre-WTO PTAs exhibited higher levels of corruption. This claim is general and is not indicative of the undesirability of trade agreements. Nevertheless, the findings reveal interesting factors related to trade agreements in the pre-WTO period.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592615000211
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Analysis and Policy.

Volume (Year): 47 (2015)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 1-10

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:1-10
DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2015.06.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economic-analysis-and-policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
  2. Dromel, Nicolas L. & Kolakez, Elie & Lehmann, Etienne, 2010. "Credit constraints and the persistence of unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 823-834, October.
  3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Federico Bonaglia & Jorge Braga de Macedo & Maurizio Bussolo, 2009. "How Globalisation Improves Governance," Chapters,in: The Law and Economics of Globalisation, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  5. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
  6. Nicolas L. Dromel & Elie Kolakez & Etienne Lehmann, 2009. "Credit constraints and persistence of unemployment," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09032, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  7. Herzfeld, Thomas & Weiss, Christoph, 2003. "Corruption and legal (in)effectiveness: an empirical investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 621-632, September.
  8. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
  9. Tavares, Jose, 2003. "Does foreign aid corrupt?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 99-106, April.
  10. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
  11. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
  12. Paldam, Martin, 2001. "Corruption and Religion Adding to the Economic Model," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2-3), pages 383-413.
  13. Stulz, Rene M. & Williamson, Rohan, 2003. "Culture, openness, and finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 313-349, December.
  14. Luisa Blanco & Robin Grier, 2009. "Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Political Instability in Latin America," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 76-95.
  15. Miguel Braun & Rafael Di tella, 2004. "Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 77-100, 03.
  16. International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation; Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09.
  18. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-1042, July.
  19. Christopher F Baum, 2008. "Stata tip 63: Modeling proportions," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 8(2), pages 299-303, June.
  20. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  21. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-1087, December.
  22. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  23. Denis Medvedev, 2010. "Preferential trade agreements and their role in world trade," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(2), pages 199-222, June.
  24. Tugrul Gurgur & Anwar Shah, 2014. "Localization and corruption: panacea or pandora's box?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 109-136, May.
  25. [multiple or corporate authorship]., 2014. "CASE annual report 2013," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  26. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
  27. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-1426, November.
  28. Kunicov , Jana & Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(04), pages 573-606, October.
  29. Stephen Knack & Omar Azfar, 2003. "Trade intensity, country size and corruption," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, 04.
  30. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
  31. Michael P. Murray, 2006. "Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak Instruments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 111-132, Fall.
  32. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
  33. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
  34. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00389762 is not listed on IDEAS
  35. Paola Cardamone & Margherita Scoppola, 2012. "The Impact of EU Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(11), pages 1473-1501, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:1-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.