Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills
This paper examines voting by U.S. Representatives on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round Agreement, and most-favored nation status for China. Using recent political economy models of trade policy to formulate an empirical specification of congressional voting behavior, we find evidence that campaign contributions influenced legislators' votes on the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills. Labor group contributions were associated with votes against freer trade while business contributions were associated with votes in favor of freer trade. Economic conditions in each member's district as well as the broad policy views of the legislators also affected representatives' voting decisions. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 105 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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