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Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills

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Listed author(s):
  • Baldwin, Robert E
  • Magee, Christopher S

Abstract

This paper examines voting by U.S. Representatives on the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Uruguay Round Agreement, and most-favored nation status for China. Using recent political economy models of trade policy to formulate an empirical specification of congressional voting behavior, we find evidence that campaign contributions influenced legislators' votes on the NAFTA and Uruguay Round bills. Labor group contributions were associated with votes against freer trade while business contributions were associated with votes in favor of freer trade. Economic conditions in each member's district as well as the broad policy views of the legislators also affected representatives' voting decisions. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 105 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 79-101

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:105:y:2000:i:1-2:p:79-101
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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-1187, December.
  2. Robert Baldwin, 1984. "Rent-seeking and trade policy: An industry approach," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 120(4), pages 662-677, December.
  3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
  4. Preeg, Ernest H., 1995. "Traders in a Brave New World," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226679594, August.
  5. Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, 03.
  6. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February.
  7. Bender, Bruce & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. "Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 67-100, April.
  8. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
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