On Why Rates Of Assistance Differ Between Australia'S Rural Industries
An economic theory of politics is applied to the question of why there are large differences in effective rates of assistance to Australia's rural industries. It is suggested that a major part of the explanation is the different incentives faced by industry lobby groups to demand assistance and by the government to supply assistance. Various determinants of the incentives to demand and supply assistance are hypothesized, and these hypotheses are tested against the existing pattern of rural assistance. The evidence generally supports the hypotheses, and suggests some policy changes to reduce existing government distortions.
Volume (Year): 22 (1978)
Issue (Month): 02-03 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jones, Ronald W., 1975. "Income distribution and effective protection in a multicommodity trade model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, August.
- Pincus, J J, 1975. "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 757-78, August.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1974. "Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium for a Small Open Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 955-67, Sept./Oct.
- Schultz, Theodore W, 1975. "The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 827-46, September.
- Campbell, Keith O., 1966. "Australian Farm Organizations And Agricultural Policy," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 10(02), December.
- Richard E. Caves, 1976. "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-300, May.
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