IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism : evidence from the Caribbean


  • Gawande, Kishore
  • Maloney, William
  • Montes Rojas, Gabriel V.


There exist legal channels for informational lobbying of U.S. policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. This paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism, and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. Panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and U.S. tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Gawande, Kishore & Maloney, William & Montes Rojas, Gabriel V., 2009. "Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism : evidence from the Caribbean," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4834, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4834

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2003. "Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 4077, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Jacint Balaguer & Manuel Cantavella-Jorda, 2002. "Tourism as a long-run economic growth factor: the Spanish case," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(7), pages 877-884.
    3. Rosensweig, Jeffrey A., 1988. "Elasticities of substitution in Caribbean tourism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 89-100, July.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    5. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
    7. Steven Husted, 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 89-99, Jan-Mar.
    8. Rinaldo Brau & Alessandro Lanza & Francesco Pigliaru, 2003. "How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing? The cross-country evidence," Working Papers 2003.85, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. M. Thea Sinclair, 1998. "Tourism and economic development: A survey," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(5), pages 1-51.
    10. James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 2003. "Information, International Substitutability, and Globalization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 775-791, June.
    11. William Maloney & Gabriel V. Montes Rojas, 2005. "How elastic are sea, sand and sun? Dynamic panel estimates of the demand for tourism," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 277-280.
    12. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2007. "Market access for sale," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 79-94, January.
    13. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Special Interest Politics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262571676, January.
    14. Lokman Gunduz & Abdulnasser Hatemi-J, 2005. "Is the tourism-led growth hypothesis valid for Turkey?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(8), pages 499-504.
    15. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
    16. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    17. Tiago Neves Sequeira & Carla Campos, 2005. "International Tourism and Economic Growth: a Panel Data Approach," Working Papers 2005.141, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
    19. James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 2002. "Ethnic Chinese Networks In International Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 116-130, February.
    20. Anderson, James E, 1979. "A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 106-116, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Belloc, Marianna, 2015. "Information for sale in the European Union," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 130-144.
    2. Prachi Mishra & Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, 2010. "Protection for Free? the Political Economy of U.S. Tariff suspensions," IMF Working Papers 10/211, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    5. repec:spr:empeco:v:53:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1168-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    More about this item


    Trade Policy; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Tourism and Ecotourism; Debt Markets; Economic Theory&Research;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4834. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi) or (Pavel Petrov). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.