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Cross-border political donations and Pareto-efficient tariffs

Listed author(s):
  • Masahiro Endoh

Lobbying activities across international borders could promote international trade policy cooperation because of two distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly. Second, cross-border donations make ruling parties take into account the impact of their policy on other countries. They promote efficiency of policy formation. Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained under the conditions that all individuals participate in lobbying activities, ruling parties value the sum of cross-border donations and the sum of domestic gross welfare and domestic donations equally, and contribution schedules are observable to anyone.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09638199.2010.512391
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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.

Volume (Year): 21 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 493-512

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Handle: RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:21:y:2012:i:4:p:493-512
DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2010.512391
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RJTE20

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