Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?
In: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements
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- Limao, Nuno, 2005. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-199, September.
- Nuno Limão, 2002. "Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?," International Trade 0206002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Jul 2002.
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Keywords
Trade; International Trade; WTO; World Trade Organization; Investment; Globalization; Externality; Policy; Cooperation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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