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Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War*

* This paper has been replicated

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Berger
  • William Easterly
  • Nathan Nunn
  • Shanker Satyanath

Abstract

We provide evidence that increased political influence, arising from CIA interventions during the Cold War, was used to create a larger foreign market for American products. Following CIA interventions, imports from the US increased dramatically, while total exports to the US were unaffected. The surge in imports was concentrated in industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage, not a comparative advantage. Our analysis is able to rule out decreased trade costs, changing political ideology, and an increase in US loans and grants as alternative explanations. We provide evidence that the increased imports arose through direct purchases of American products by foreign governments. (JEL D72, F14, F54, N42, N72)

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Berger & William Easterly & Nathan Nunn & Shanker Satyanath, 2013. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 863-896, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:863-96
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.863
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Replication

    This item has been replicated by:
  • Bruno Ćorić, 2016. "CIA Interventions, Tariff Changes, and Trade During the Cold War: A Variation and New Results," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 13(2), pages 192–199-1, May.

    • More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N72 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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    This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:
    1. Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade during the Cold War (AER 2013) in ReplicationWiki

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