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Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks

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  • Garcia, Daniel

Abstract

This paper deals with information acquisition and communication in networked organizations. Agents receive private signals about a payoff-relevant parameter and may communicate it to other players to whom they are linked. I derive a key condition that ensures truthful communication. Since the degree of substitution between information acquired and obtained through personal contacts depends on the truthfulness of communication, information acquisition efforts may not be monotonic. Finally, I show that these results hold in a modified version of the game that includes potentially infinite many rounds of communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia, Daniel, 2012. "Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks," MPRA Paper 55481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55481
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55481/1/MPRA_paper_55481.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
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    4. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron & Bimpikis, Kostas & Ozdaglar, Asuman, 2014. "Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    6. Christian Hellwig & Laura Veldkamp, 2009. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 223-251.
    7. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2012. "Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 340-374.
    8. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    9. Ozsoylev, Han N. & Walden, Johan, 2011. "Asset pricing in large information networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2252-2280.
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    11. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    13. Wouter Dessein & Tano Santos, 2006. "Adaptive Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 956-985, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Networks; Complex Organizations;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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