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Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks

  • Garcia, Daniel

This paper deals with information acquisition and communication in networked organizations. Agents receive private signals about a payoff-relevant parameter and may communicate it to other players to whom they are linked. I derive a key condition that ensures truthful communication. Since the degree of substitution between information acquired and obtained through personal contacts depends on the truthfulness of communication, information acquisition efforts may not be monotonic. Finally, I show that these results hold in a modified version of the game that includes potentially infinite many rounds of communication.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55481/1/MPRA_paper_55481.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 55481.

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Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision: 24 Apr 2014
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55481
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  1. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik & Jeremy C. Stein, 2003. "The Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trade of Money Managers," NBER Working Papers 9711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bolton, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 809-39, November.
  3. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.
  4. Ozsoylev, Han N. & Walden, Johan, 2011. "Asset pricing in large information networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2252-2280.
  5. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2012. "Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 340-374.
  6. Hellwig, Christian & Veldkamp, Laura, 2007. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers 6506, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2010. "Dynamics of Information Exchange in Endogenous Social Networks," NBER Working Papers 16410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 719-752.
  9. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
  10. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
  11. Wouter Dessein & Tano Santos, 2006. "Adaptive Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 956-985, October.
  12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  13. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  14. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
  15. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
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