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Strategic information transmission networks

Listed author(s):
  • Galeotti, Andrea
  • Ghiglino, Christian
  • Squintani, Francesco

We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053113000823
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 1751-1769

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1751-1769
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Takahashi, Satoru & Ambrus, Attila, 2008. "Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces," Scholarly Articles 3200263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2005. "Communication Networks with Endogenous Link Strength," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 723, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic communication networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09005, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  6. Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
  7. Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
  8. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  9. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
  11. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 2996, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  12. John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Polls," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 864-896, June.
  13. Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989. "Cheap Talk With Two Audiences," Working papers 518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  14. Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA.
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  16. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2008. "Core and periphery in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 295-309, March.
  17. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
  18. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2008. "Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586854, HAL.
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