Strategic information transmission networks
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,"
1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Takahashi, Satoru & Ambrus, Attila, 2008.
"Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces,"
3200263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ambrus, Attila & Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2005.
"Communication Networks with Endogenous Link Strength,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
723, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.
- Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta, 2008. "Communication networks with endogeneous link strength," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 08-15, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009.
"Strategic communication networks,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
09005, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Strategic communication networks," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586847, HAL.
- Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.
- Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
- Marco Battaglini, 2000.
"Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1557, Econometric Society.
- Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
- Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
- Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
- Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2003.
"Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players,"
Economics Discussion Papers
2996, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Polls," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 864-896, June.
- Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989.
"Cheap Talk With Two Audiences,"
518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1999.
"Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts,"
1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999.
"A Model of Expertise,"
Game Theory and Information
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2008. "Core and periphery in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 295-309, March.
- Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011.
"How to talk to multiple audiences,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
- Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2008. "Multidimensional communication mechanisms: cooperative and conflicting designs," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586854, HAL.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:1751-1769. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.