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Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime

Author

Listed:
  • Touria Jaaidane

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Olivier Musy

    (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité)

  • Ronan Tallec

    (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité)

Abstract

We analyze the conflict between king Louis XV and the venal office-holders who were members of the French parliaments throughout the eighteenth century. There are contrasting views as to the nature of this confrontation. We consider that the parliaments cooperated with the king as long as their rents were protected. However, they opposed political measures that were likely to harm them. In particular, the introduction of a competing body of civil servants, the intendants, was a major cause of conflict, as they were responsible for the enforcement of reforms that reduced the privileges of office-holders. We propose an analytical narrative of the late French Old Regime and provide an empirical test of our predictions. The data suggest that the political opposition of the French parliaments was primarily a response to the king's reform agenda on matters that would reduce their income and political power.

Suggested Citation

  • Touria Jaaidane & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2022. "Rent-seeking, reform, and conflict: French parliaments at the end of the Old Regime," Post-Print hal-03971443, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03971443
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01021-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis Rouanet, 2024. "On the tendency of revolutions to devour their own children," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 603-626, September.
    2. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2025. "Judicial venality in Old Regime France: A rational choice analysis," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 704-726.
    3. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2024. "Judicial Venality: A Rational Choice Analysis," Working Papers AFED 24-05, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    4. Cutsinger, Bryan P. & Rouanet, Louis & Ingber, Joshua S., 2023. "Assignats or death: The politics and dynamics of hyperinflation in revolutionary France," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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