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Judicial Venality: A Rational Choice Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Bertrand Crettez

    (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED, EA 7321 - 75005 Paris.)

  • Bruno Deffains

    (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED, EA 7321 - 75005 Paris.)

  • Olivier Musy

    (Université Paris Cité, LIRAES, F-75006 Paris, France.)

  • Ronan Tallec

    (Université Paris Cité, LIRAES, F-75006 Paris, France.)

Abstract

Venality, i.e., the sale of public positions, was widely used in the judicial sector in France between the 16th and 18th centuries. In a venal system, litigants finance the justice system by paying the judges directly. In France, moreover, the right to judge was sold by the ruler, who indirectly levied part of the legal costs. Here, instead of the state funding justice, justice funds the state. The cost to the King was a loss of control over the judiciary and biased legal decisions. We develop a model of judicial venality and build on this model to provide an analytical narrative of the rise and decline of judicial venality in Old Regime France. Historically, judicial venality enhanced legal capacity whereas the kings faced with limited opportunities to raise taxes and to borrow. Lack of control over the judiciary, however, led to overly costly and time-consuming trials, resulting in its final demise.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2024. "Judicial Venality: A Rational Choice Analysis," Working Papers AFED 24-05, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).
    • Handle: RePEc:afd:wpaper:2405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law and Economics; Judicial Venality; Private Justice; Institutional and Legal Design; Economic Analysis of the History of Law; French Old Regime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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