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State capacity and executive constraints in early modern Europe

Author

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  • Antonio Henriques
  • K. Kivanc Karaman
  • Nuno Palma

Abstract

The prevailing view of Europe’s political history is that the rise of constrained governments and the increases in state capacity advanced hand in hand. In this study, we reevaluate this perspective by constructing new historical indices for both. Our findings challenge the presumed connection, illustrating that high-capacity states existed under unconstrained government, and low-capacity states existed under constrained regimes. We also identify what made England historically distinctive: its political system stood out for combining constrained government with high state capacity. This rare combination helps explain the eventual take-off of modern economic growth in England.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Henriques & K. Kivanc Karaman & Nuno Palma, 2025. "State capacity and executive constraints in early modern Europe," Lewis Lab Working Papers Series 0010, Arthur Lewis Lab, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:allwps:0010
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    File URL: https://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=75732
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    historical political economy; executive constraints; state capacity; government effectiveness; checks and balances;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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