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The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine

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  • Garrett Ryan Wood

    (Virginia Wesleyan University)

Abstract

When war broke out in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the government of Ukraine failed to provide adequate defense to maintain its territorial integrity. In the wake of this government failure, several private volunteer efforts arose to meet popular demand for military action against Russian-backed Separatists. These volunteer battalions had to find alternative methods of aligning their incentives with the population wishing to be defended, and alternative methods of aligning the incentives of their leadership and their recruits. The success of these battalions depended on the potential for political careers and favors, the strength of reputation mechanisms in small communities, and the potential for loot and spoils. These factors shaped the size, characteristics, and activities of the volunteer battalions.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrett Ryan Wood, 2022. "The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 115-134, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09342-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09342-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Voluntary provision; National defense; Organizational structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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