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Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion

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  • MARK I. LICHBACH

    (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Abstract

This article rethinks the Rebel's Dilemma, or Collective Action (CA) problem in political dissent. The author argues that the marriage of CA theories and conflict studies has largely failed. To remedy this situation, a new typology of solutions to the CA problem is proposed. One set of solutions is based on the Market. Such solutions focus on changes in the parameters of the canonical model of CA. The other three sets of solutions are based on varying the context in which the baseline model is placed. Community solutions focus on how common belief systems solve Olson's problem, Contract solutions on how mutual agreements produce CA, and Hierarchy solutions on how authority structures CA. Approximately two dozen sets of solutions to the CA problem are placed within this four fold typology. The existence of so many potential solutions implies that it is relatively easy to solve the Rebel's Dilemma. Rather than trying to explain why rational people rebel, the focus should be on solutions as politics: the struggle between dissident groups trying to implement solutions and regimes trying to impede those solutions. The challenges then become to determine the conditions under which one or more combinations of solutions are adopted and the conditions under which they are effective. Evaluating such explanations will be difficult because the politics of CA renders aggregate levels and particular outbreaks of collective dissent unstable and unpredictable. A combination of Lakatosian and Popperian criteria will be needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark I. Lichbach, 1994. "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 8-39, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:8-39
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463194006001003
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    6. Leeson, Peter T., 2010. "Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 297-307, March.
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    9. Thomas Apolte, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 158-178, June.
    10. Olga Nicoara & David White, 2016. "A Contextual Model Of The Secessionist Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine," Papers 1606.02748, arXiv.org.
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