Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rabin Matthew, 1994.
"A Model of Pre-game Communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 370-391, August.
- Matthew Rabin., 1991. "A Model of Pre-Game Communication," Economics Working Papers 91-164, University of California at Berkeley.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1991. "A Model of Pre-Game Communication," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt902697n7, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
- Utikal, Verena, 2012.
"A fault confessed is half redressed—Confessions and punishment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 314-327.
- Verena Utikal, 2010. "A fault confessed is half redressed - Confessions and Punishment," TWI Research Paper Series 60, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, UniversitÃ¤t Konstanz.
- Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber, 2012.
"Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 720-749, April.
- Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," Scholarly Articles 11223697, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Joseph E. Harrington & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2011.
"Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2425-2449, October.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices," Economics Working Paper Archive 555, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002.
"A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Discussion Papers 1264, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society.
- repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-016-9494-z is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:726-743 is not listed on IDEAS
- Matthias Blonski & Peter Ockenfels & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 164-192, August.
- Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
- Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov & Stanford, William, 1988. "A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(3), pages 177-186.
More about this item
Keywordsinfinitely repeated games; monitoring; communication; cooperation; strategic uncertainty; prisonerâ€™s dilemma;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-12-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2018-12-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2018-12-03 (Game Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gregor Walter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/twikrch.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.