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Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication

Author

Listed:
  • Richard McLean

    (Rutgers University)

  • Ichiro Obara

    (UCLA)

  • Andrew Postlewaite

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated \folk theorems" have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient attention paid to the robustness of a large set of equilibria that is needed for such folk theorems. Starting with perfect public equilibrium as our starting point, we study uniformly strict equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring and direct communication (cheap talk). We characterize the limit equilibrium payoff set and identify the conditions for the folk theorem to hold with uniformly strict equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:23-018
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. César Martinelli, 2025. "Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of David K. Levine," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 417-420, September.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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