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Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]

Author

Listed:
  • P. Courtois

    (Université Autonome de Barcelone, Département des fondements économiques - UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona [Barcelona])

  • Tarik Tazdaït

    () (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as uch while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concesions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to acept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concesion. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2008. "Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]," Post-Print hal-00716360, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00716360
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00716360
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