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What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours

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  • Guilhem Lecouteux

Abstract

this editorial presents the main contributions of the theory of team reasoning in game theory, and the issues that remain to be solved before this theory could become a credible alternative to ?orthodox? game theory. I argue in particular that an approach based on collective agency rather than rational choice theory and social preferences offer a scientifically preferable theory of unselfish behaviours, both in terms of parsimony and empirical validation. I review the economic literature on team reasoning, and highlight the contributions of the papers of the present volume to tackle the open issues of the theory of team reasoning.

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  • Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_283_0311
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Newton, 2019. "Agency Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, March.
    2. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device," Working Papers halshs-01923244, HAL.
    3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2021. "Who's Afraid of Incoherence? Behavioural Welfare Economics and the Sovereignty of the Neoclassical Consumer," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-01, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    team reasoning; preferences; rationality; cooperation; coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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