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Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample

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  • ZHIXIN Dai
  • Jiwei Zheng
  • Daniel J. Zizzo

Abstract

We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not.

Suggested Citation

  • ZHIXIN Dai & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2020. "Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample," Working Papers 305138067, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:305138067
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    external validity; non-student sample; focal points; team reasoning; level-k; coordination games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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