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On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium

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  • Bertrand Crettez

    () (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II)

Abstract

Abstract Cooperative behavior is often observed in ordinary market transactions. To account for this observation, Robert Sugden proposes a team reasoning theory in which the common interest of team reasoners is defined by the notion of mutually beneficial practice. We study the relationships between mutually beneficial practices and Berge equilibria (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). We propose two sufficient conditions under which a (strict) Berge equilibrium is a mutually beneficial practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(4), pages 357-366, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:64:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s12232-017-0278-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-017-0278-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
    2. A.M. Colman & T.W. Körner & O. Musy & T. Tazdaït, 2011. "Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria," Post-Print hal-00716357, HAL.
    3. Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdait, 2012. "A New Theorem To Find Berge Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-10.
    4. Larbani, Moussa & Nessah, Rabia, 2008. "A note on the existence of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 258-271, March.
    5. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2015. "How To Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 123-139, March.
    6. Robert Sugden, 2011. "Mutual advantage, conventions and team reasoning," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(1), pages 9-20, March.
    7. Kerim Keskin & H. Çağrı Sağlam, 2015. "On the Existence of Berge Equilibrium: An Order Theoretic Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(03), pages 1-9.
    8. Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani, 2014. "Berge–Zhukovskii Equilibria: Existence And Characterization," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-11.
    9. Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi & Ploner, Matteo, 2013. "Group membership, team preferences, and expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 183-190.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand Crettez, 2019. "Unilateral Support Equilibrium, Berge Equilibrium, and Team Problems Solutions," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 17(4), pages 727-739, December.
    2. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Berge equilibrium; Berge–Vaisman equilibrium; Mutually beneficial practice; Strict Berge equilibrium; Team reasoning; Sufficient condition;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D - Microeconomics

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