IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v86y2013icp183-190.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Group membership, team preferences, and expectations

Author

Listed:
  • Guala, Francesco
  • Mittone, Luigi
  • Ploner, Matteo

Abstract

Group membership is a powerful determinant of social behaviour in a variety of experimental games. Its effect may be channelled primarily via the beliefs of group members, or directly change their social preferences. We report an experiment with a prisoner's dilemma with multiple actions, in which we manipulate players’ beliefs and show that group identity has a consistent positive effect on cooperation only when there is common knowledge of group affiliation. We also test the robustness of the minimal group effect using three different manipulations: one manipulation fails to induce group identity, and we observe an unsystematic effect of group membership when knowledge of affiliation is asymmetric.

Suggested Citation

  • Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi & Ploner, Matteo, 2013. "Group membership, team preferences, and expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 183-190.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:86:y:2013:i:c:p:183-190 DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268112002624
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ruffle, Bradley J. & Sosis, Richard, 2006. "Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: A field test on Israeli kibbutz members and city residents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 147-163, June.
    2. Daniel J. Benjamin & James J. Choi & A. Joshua Strickland, 2010. "Social Identity and Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1913-1928, September.
    3. Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2247-2257.
    4. Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
    5. Bicchieri, Cristina & Erte, Xiao, 2007. "Do the right thing: But only if others do so," MPRA Paper 4609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Arthur Schram, 2005. "Artificiality: The tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 225-237.
    7. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 347-370, May.
    8. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    9. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
    10. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
    11. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
    12. Guala,Francesco, 2005. "The Methodology of Experimental Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521618618, March.
    13. Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap & Daniel John Zizzo, 2009. "The Value of Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 295-323, March.
    14. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
    15. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2005. "Managing diversity by creating team identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 371-392, November.
    16. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June.
    17. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    18. Sugden, Robert, 2000. "Team Preferences," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 175-204, October.
    19. Daniel Zizzo, 2011. "You are not in my boat: common fate and discrimination against outgroup members," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(1), pages 91-103, March.
    20. Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, 2009. "Group Identity and Social Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 431-457, March.
    21. Helen Bernhard & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2006. "Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 217-221, May.
    22. Güth, Werner & Ploner, Matteo & Regner, Tobias, 2009. "Determinants of in-group bias: Is group affiliation mediated by guilt-aversion?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 814-827, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alessandra Smerilli, 2012. "We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 539-560, October.
    2. Hugh Jones, David; Leroch, Martin A, 2011. "Reciprocity towards Groups," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 52, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. Christoph Feldhaus & Johannes Mans, 2014. "Who do you lie to? Social identity and the cost of lying," Working Paper Series in Economics 76, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    4. Butler, Je rey V. & Conzo, Pierluigi & Leroch, Martin A., 2013. "Social Identity and Punishment," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201329, University of Turin.
    5. Julien Benistant & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests," Working Papers halshs-01592007, HAL.
    6. Gallier, Carlo & Goeschl, Timo & Kesternich, Martin & Lohse, Johannes & Reif, Christiane & Römer, Daniel, 2017. "Leveling up? An inter-neighborhood experiment on parochialism and the efficiency of multi-level public goods provision," Working Papers 0630, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    7. Tor Eriksson & Lei Mao & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Saving face and group identity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 622-647, September.
    8. Gabriele Chierchia & Fabio Tufano & Giorgio Coricelli, 2017. "Friends or Strangers? Strategic Uncertainty and Cooperation across Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Discussion Papers 2017-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    9. Julien Benistant & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "Unethical Behavior and Group Identity in Contests," Working Papers 1725, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    10. Grimm, Veronika & Utikal, Verena & Valmasoni, Lorenzo, 2015. "In-group favoritism and discrimination among multiple out-groups," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 05/2015, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    11. Drouvelis, Michalis & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2013. "Group identity and leading-by-example," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, pages 414-425.
    12. Dominique Cappelletti & Luigi Mittone & Matteo Ploner, 2015. "Language and intergroup discrimination. Evidence from an experiment," CEEL Working Papers 1504, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    13. Ekaterina Melnik & Jean-Benoît Zimmermann, 2015. "The We and the I: The Logic of Voluntary Associations," Working Papers halshs-01109609, HAL.
    14. Francesco GUALA & Antonio FILIPPIN, 2013. "The Effect of Group Identity on Distributive Choice: Social Preference or Heuristic?," Departmental Working Papers 2013-19, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    15. repec:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:29-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Ockenfels, Axel & Werner, Peter, 2014. "Beliefs and ingroup favoritism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 453-462.
    17. Tom Lane, 2015. "Discrimination in the laboratory: a meta-analysis," Discussion Papers 2015-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    18. repec:eee:jeborg:v:143:y:2017:i:c:p:254-271 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Group identity; Team preferences; Social dilemmas; Experimental economics;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:86:y:2013:i:c:p:183-190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.