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Group Identity and Leading-by-Example

Listed author(s):
  • Michalis Drouvelis

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham)

  • Daniele Nosenzo

    ()

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)

We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous identities. We find no effect on cooperation when only part of the followers share the leader’s identity, or when followers share a common identity that differs from that of the leader. We conclude that group identity is an effective but fragile instrument to promote cooperation.

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File URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/cedex-discussion-paper-2012-05.pdf
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Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2012-05.

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Date of creation: May 2012
Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-05
Contact details of provider: Postal:
School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD

Phone: (44) 0115 951 5620
Fax: (0115) 951 4159
Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/

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