Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents
The in-group-out-group bias is among the most well documented and widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences. Despite its role in hiring decisions and job discrimination, negotiations, and conflict and competition between groups, economists have heretofore ignored the in- group-out-group bias. We question the universality of the bias by designing field experiments to test whether it extends to the cooperative behavior of one of the most successful and best-known modern collective societies, the Israeli kibbutz. The facts that kibbutz members have voluntarily chosen their lifestyle of cooperation and egalitarianism, the ease with which they could join the surrounding capitalist society, their disproportionate involvement in social and national causes and their revealed willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of Israeli society as a whole suggest that if ever there was a society of individuals whose cooperativeness extends equally to members and non-members, the kibbutz is it. Nonetheless, the findings from our field experiments indicate that kibbutz members display higher levels of cooperation when paired with anonymous kibbutz members than when paired with city residents. In fact, when paired with city residents, kibbutz members’ observed levels of cooperation are identical to those displayed by the city residents. Moreover, we present evidence that kibbutz socialization actually damages the willingness of members to cooperate with one another.
|Date of creation:||05 Oct 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - Microsoft Word; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 28 ; figures: included. We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://220.127.116.11|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fershtman, C. & Gneezy, U., 2000.
"Discrimination in a Segmented Society: an Experimental Approach,"
2000-9, Tel Aviv.
- Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, 2001. "Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 351-377, February.
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000.
"Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out,"
Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
- Cleve Willis & John Stranlund & Juan-Camilo Cardenas, 2000. "Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out," Artefactual Field Experiments 00028, The Field Experiments Website.
- Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
- Samuel, Yitzhak & Heilbrunn, Sibylle, 2001. "Entrepreneurship in the Kibbutz Setting: Towards a Classification of New Business Ventures," Journal of Rural Cooperation, Hebrew University, Center for Agricultural Economic Research, vol. 29(1).
- Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June.
- Matthew Rabin., 1992.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
Economics Working Papers
92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2000. "Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(4), pages 661-, December.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991.
"Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.