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The perils of peer punishment. Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment

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  • Gioia de Melo

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

  • Matías Piaggio

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía)

Abstract

We provide a model and experimental evidence on the effects of non-monetary punishment (NMP) by peers among communities of Uruguayan fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We find a) experimental groups composed of fishers from different communities (out-groups) who are sometimes in conflict over fishing territories did not overxploit the resource more than gropus from a single community (in-groups) and, unlike in-groups, out-groups reduced their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment; b) cooperative individuals punished free riders while a substantial amount of punishment was targeted by free riders on cooperators, who [in turns] responded by increasing their exploitation of the resource; and c)wealthier individuals practiced greater overexploitation of the resource. Our results suggest that the relevance of in-group favoritism in promoting cooperation due to social preferences may be overrated, and that the effectiveness of peer punishment is greater when individuals are motivated by social preferencies and also that coordination is required to prevent anti-social targeting and to enhance the social signal conveyed by the punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Gioia de Melo & Matías Piaggio, 2012. "The perils of peer punishment. Evidence from a common pool resource framed field experiment," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-16, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-16-12
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    Keywords

    Non-monetary punishment; In-group bias; Frame field experiment; Social preferences; Common pool resource;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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