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How To Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules


  • Courtois, Pierre
  • Nessah, Rabia
  • Tazdaït, Tarik


Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

Suggested Citation

  • Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2015. "How To Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 123-139, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:31:y:2015:i:01:p:123-139_00

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    Cited by:

    1. Bertrand Crettez, 2019. "Unilateral Support Equilibrium, Berge Equilibrium, and Team Problems Solutions," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 17(4), pages 727-739, December.
    2. Courtois, Pierre & Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2017. "Existence and computation of Berge equilibrium and of two refinements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-15.
    3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
    4. Giannini Italino Alves Vieira & Leandro Chaves Rêgo, 2020. "Berge Solution Concepts in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 103-125, February.
    5. Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018. "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper 2018-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Rodica Ioana Lung & Mihai Suciu & Noémi Gaskó & D Dumitrescu, 2015. "Characterization and Detection of ϵ-Berge-Zhukovskii Equilibria," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(7), pages 1-15, July.
    7. Olivier Musy & Antonin Pottier & Tarik Tazdait, 2012. "A New Theorem To Find Berge Equilibria," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(01), pages 1-10.
    8. Sylvain Baumann, 2017. "Spying Solution In The Framework Of Terrorist Conflicts," Post-Print hal-02949086, HAL.
    9. Antonin Pottier & Rabia Nessah, 2014. "Berge–Vaisman And Nash Equilibria: Transformation Of Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-8.
    10. Rabia Nessah & Moussa Larbani, 2014. "Berge–Zhukovskii Equilibria: Existence And Characterization," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(04), pages 1-11.
    11. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "A New Sufficient Condition for a Berge Equilibrium to be a Berge–Vaisman Equilibrium," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(3), pages 451-459, September.
    12. Crettez, Bertrand & Nessah, Rabia, 2020. "On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 41-47.
    13. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(4), pages 357-366, December.
    14. Bertrand Crettez, 2017. "On Hobbes’s state of nature and game theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 499-511, December.

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