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The long-term viability of team reasoning

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  • S.M. Amadae
  • Daniel Lempert

Abstract

Team reasoning gives a simple, coherent, and rational explanation for human cooperative behavior (Bacharach 1999; Sugden 1993). This paper investigates the robustness of team reasoning as an explanation for cooperative behavior, by assessing its long-run viability. We consider an evolutionary game theoretic model in which the population consists of team reasoners and ‘conventional’ individual reasoners. We find that changes in the ludic environment can affect evolutionary outcomes, and that in many circumstances, team reasoning may thrive, even under conditions that, at first glance, may seem unfavorable. We also pursue several extensions that augment the basic account, and conclude that team reasoning is an evolutionarily viable mechanism with the potential to explain behavior in a range of human interactions.

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  • S.M. Amadae & Daniel Lempert, 2015. "The long-term viability of team reasoning," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 462-478, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:22:y:2015:i:4:p:462-478
    DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1024880
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    Cited by:

    1. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.

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