Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games
We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2017|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2017|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Methodology|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 250, rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne|
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