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Rational expectations in games

Author

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  • AUMANN, Robert J.
  • DREZE, Jacques H.

Abstract

A player i's actions in a game are determined by her beliefs about other players; these depend on the game's real-life context, not only its formal description. Define a game situation as a game together with such beliefs; call the beliefs— and i's resulting expectation—rational if there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. In two-person zero-sum games, i's only rational expectation is the game’s value. In an arbitrary game G, we characterize i's rational expectations in terms of the correlated equilibria of the doubled game 2G in which each of i's strategies in G appears twice. (JEL C72, D83, D84)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2009. "Rational expectations in games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2011
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.1.72
    Note: In : American Economic Review, 98(1), 72-86, 2008
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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