Interim Partially Correlated Rationalizability
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's "game-theoretic" view and Aumann's "Bayesian decision-theoretic" view of the world. We follow the game-theoretic view, propose and study interim partially correlated rationalizability for games with incomplete information. We argue that the distinction between this solution concept and the interim correlated rationalizability studied by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) is fundamental, in that the latter implicitly follows Aumann's Bayesian view. Our main result shows that two types provide the same prediction in interim partially correlated rationalizability if and only if they have the same infinite hierarchy of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We also establish an equivalence result between this solution concept and the Bayesian solution--a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993).
|Date of creation:||11 Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014.
"Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Interim Correlated Rationalizability,"
122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Francoise Forges, 2006.
"Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited,"
- FranÃ§oise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
- Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/157, Paris Dauphine University.
- FORGES, FranÃ§oise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2008. "Intrinsic correlation in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 28-67, July.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006.
"Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability,"
Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006.
"Topologies on Types,"
3160489, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Liu, Qingmin, 2009. "On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2115-2145, September.
- Tang, Qianfeng, 2010. "The Bayesian Solution and Hierarchies of Beliefs," MPRA Paper 26811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26810. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.