IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this book chapter or follow this series

Foundations of strategic equilibrium

In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

  • Hillas, John
  • Kohlberg, Elon
Registered author(s):

    This chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept of rationalizability, the concept of strategic (or Nash) equilibrium is introduced. Various interpretations of this concept are discussed and a proof of the existence of such equilibria is sketched.Next, the concept of correlated equilibrium is introduced. This concept can be thought of as retaining the self-enforcing aspect of the idea of equilibrium while relaxing the independence assumption.Most of the remainder of the chapter is concerned with the ideas underlying the refinement of equilibrium: admissibility and iterated dominance; backward induction; forward induction; and ordinality and various invariances to changes in the player set. This leads to a consideration of the concept of strategic stability, a strong refinement satisfying these various ideas.Finally there is a brief examination of the epistemic approach to equilibrium and the relation between strategic equilibrium and correlated equilibrium.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7P5P-4FD79WM-5/2/6ec2485eefc5b8ef33c6f403b8399f29
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    as
    in new window

    This chapter was published in:
  • R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3, 00.
  • This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 3-42.
    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-42
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.