IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/661465000000000203.html

Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games

Author

Listed:
  • SRIHARI GOVINDAN
  • ROBERT WILSON

Abstract

We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed sub- sets called solutions. No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in a solution. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect equilibrium and thus a sequential equilibrium in strategies that provide conditionally admissible optimal continuations from information sets. A refinement is immune to embedding a game in a larger game with additional players provided the original players' strategies and payoffs are preserved, i.e. solutions of a game are the same as those induced by the solutions of any larger game in which it is embedded. For games with two players and generic payoffs, we prove that these axioms characterize each solution as an essential component of equilibria in undominated strategies, and thus a stable set as defined by Mertens (1989).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000203
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4661465000000000203.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen, 2014. "On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 395-402, May.
    2. Francesc Dilmé, 2023. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 254, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    3. Srihari Govindan & Robert B. Wilson, 2025. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection: The Case of Generic Extensive Form Games," Papers 2504.16908, arXiv.org.
    4. Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012. "Forward induction equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 265-276.
    5. Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020. "A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 240-255.
    6. Sun, Lan, 2016. "Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    7. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
    8. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
    9. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "Sequentially Stable Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(4), pages 1097-1134, July.
    10. Dieter Balkenborg & Dries Vermeulen, 2016. "Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart—A Study of Minimal Diversity Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 278-292, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.