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The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games

  • Demichelis, Stefano

    (CORE)

  • Ritzberger, Klaus

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies)

  • Swinkels, Jeroen M.

    (John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University at St. Louis)

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.

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File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-115.pdf
File Function: First version, 2002
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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 115.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:115
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  1. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  2. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series 383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154427 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. van Damme, E.E.C., 1984. "A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games," Other publications TiSEM 3734d89e-fd5c-4c80-a230-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  5. van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Other publications TiSEM bd598a8f-f017-4cab-a9ed-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  6. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  7. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
  8. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154422 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
  11. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Discussion Papers 1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
  13. Ritzberger, Klaus, 1994. "The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-36.
  14. Marx, Leslie M., 1999. "Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 253-278, January.
  15. Hart, Sergiu, 2002. "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 227-264, November.
  16. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1999. "On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability," Economics Working Papers 408, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
  18. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany.
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