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Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens


  • Swinkels, Jeroen M.


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  • Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:57:y:1992:i:2:p:333-342

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    2. Gilboa, Itzhak & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 213-221, September.
    3. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107 Elsevier.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
    5. Ben-Porath Elchanan, 1993. "Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-32, February.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Matthijs van Veelen, 2010. "But Some Neutrally Stable Strategies are More Neutrally Stable than Others," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-033/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    4. DeMichelis, Stefano & Germano, Fabrizio, 2000. "On the Indices of Zeros of Nash Fields," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 192-217, October.
    5. van Veelen, Matthijs, 2012. "Robustness against indirect invasions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 382-393.
    6. Marimon, R. & McGraltan, E., 1993. "On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games," Papers 190, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    7. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2004. "The simple geometry of perfect information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, June.
    8. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," MPRA Paper 28889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 375-402, February.
    10. Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2002. "On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 66-90, September.
    11. Lars Koch, 2008. "Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
    12. Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.

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