Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version
We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin, 2008. "Winners Don't Punish," Scholarly Articles 2252594, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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"The simple geometry of perfect information games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 315-338, 06.
- Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003.
"From evolutionary to strategic stability,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
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