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The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment

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  • Alexander Isakov
  • David Rand

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  • Alexander Isakov & David Rand, 2012. "The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 97-109, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:97-109
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klaus Abbink & Benedikt Herrmann, 2011. "The Moral Costs Of Nastiness," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 631-633, April.
    2. Matthias Sutter & Stefan Haigner & Martin G. Kocher, 2010. "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1540-1566.
    3. Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, 2004. "Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem," Nature, Nature, vol. 432(7016), pages 499-502, November.
    4. Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008. "Winners don’t punish," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
    5. Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A., 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation," Scholarly Articles 3804483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
    7. Bettina Rockenbach & Manfred Milinski, 2006. "The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment," Nature, Nature, vol. 444(7120), pages 718-723, December.
    8. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    9. Paul B. Rainey & Katrina Rainey, 2003. "Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6953), pages 72-74, September.
    10. Dirk Helbing & Attila Szolnoki & Matjaž Perc & György Szabó, 2010. "Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(4), pages 1-9, April.
    11. Karl Sigmund & Hannelore De Silva & Arne Traulsen & Christoph Hauert, 2010. "Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons," Nature, Nature, vol. 466(7308), pages 861-863, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cheng, Fei & Chen, Tong & Chen, Qiao, 2020. "Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 378(C).
    2. Perry, Logan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2019. "Foresight in a Game of Leadership," SocArXiv 84yxz, Center for Open Science.
    3. Daria Roithmayr & Alexander Isakov & David Rand, 2015. "Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-26, June.
    4. Luo-Luo Jiang & Matjaž Perc & Attila Szolnoki, 2013. "If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7, May.
    5. Tatsuya Sasaki, 2014. "The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 345-362, September.

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