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Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations

Author

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  • Paul B. Rainey

    (University of Oxford
    University of Auckland)

  • Katrina Rainey

Abstract

A fundamental problem in biology is the evolutionary transition from single cells to multicellular life forms1,2,3. During this transition the unit of selection shifts from individual cells to groups of cooperating cells1,3,4. Although there is much theory5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, there are few empirical studies16. Here we describe an evolutionary transition that occurs in experimental populations of Pseudomonas fluorescens propagated in a spatially heterogeneous environment17. Cooperating groups are formed by over-production of an adhesive polymer18, which causes the interests of individuals to align with those of the group. The costs and benefits of cooperation, plus evolutionary susceptibility to defecting genotypes, were analysed to determine conformation to theory1,3,12. Cooperation was costly to individuals, but beneficial to the group. Defecting genotypes evolved in populations founded by the cooperating type and were fitter in the presence of this type than in its absence. In the short term, defectors sabotaged the viability of the group; but these findings nevertheless show that transitions to higher orders of complexity are readily achievable, provide insights into the selective conditions, and facilitate experimental analysis of the evolution of individuality.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul B. Rainey & Katrina Rainey, 2003. "Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6953), pages 72-74, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:425:y:2003:i:6953:d:10.1038_nature01906
    DOI: 10.1038/nature01906
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Archetti, 2014. "Stable Heterogeneity for the Production of Diffusible Factors in Cell Populations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(9), pages 1-8, September.
    2. Zimo Yang & Tao Zhou & Pak Ming Hui & Jian-Hong Ke, 2012. "Instability in Evolutionary Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(11), pages 1-9, November.
    3. Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2018. "Group size effects in social evolution," IAST Working Papers 18-75, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    4. Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2021. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics with payoff-dependent environmental feedback," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    5. Liu, Yuan & Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2022. "General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 165(P2).
    6. Kazufumi Hosoda & Shingo Suzuki & Yoshinori Yamauchi & Yasunori Shiroguchi & Akiko Kashiwagi & Naoaki Ono & Kotaro Mori & Tetsuya Yomo, 2011. "Cooperative Adaptation to Establishment of a Synthetic Bacterial Mutualism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(2), pages 1-9, February.
    7. Alexander Isakov & David Rand, 2012. "The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 97-109, March.
    8. Jessica L. Barker & Pat Barclay & H. Kern Reeve, 2012. "Within-group competition reduces cooperation and payoffs in human groups," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 23(4), pages 735-741.
    9. Bryan Wilder & Kenneth O Stanley, 2015. "Altruists Proliferate Even at a Selective Disadvantage within Their Own Niche," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(6), pages 1-11, June.
    10. Sam P Brown & François Taddei, 2007. "The Durability of Public Goods Changes the Dynamics and Nature of Social Dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 2(7), pages 1-7, July.
    11. Qi Su & Lei Zhou & Long Wang, 2019. "Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-22, April.
    12. Guangming Ren & Lan Liu & Mingku Feng & Yingji He, 2018. "Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(9), pages 1-11, September.
    13. Yuanxiao Gao & Arne Traulsen & Yuriy Pichugin, 2019. "Interacting cells driving the evolution of multicellular life cycles," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-16, May.
    14. Martin Schuster & Eric Foxall & David Finch & Hal Smith & Patrick De Leenheer, 2017. "Tragedy of the commons in the chemostat," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-13, December.
    15. Liu, Yan-Ping & Wang, Lin & Zhang, Feng & Wang, Rui-Wu, 2020. "Diffusion sustains cooperation via forming diverse spatial patterns in prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 375(C).

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