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The Moral Costs of Nastiness

Author

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  • Klaus Abbink

    () (CREED, University of Amsterdam)

  • Benedikt Herrmann

    () (School of Economics, The University of Nottingham)

Abstract

We introduce two variants of the one-shot joy-of-destruction minigame (mini-JOD). Two players are endowed with the same amount of money. They simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce the payoff of the other player at an own cost. In one treatment there was a probability that Nature would destroy the opponent’s money anyway. We test whether this feature reduces the moral costs of being nasty, and find that destruction rates rise significantly, despite the absence of strategic reasons.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Abbink & Benedikt Herrmann, 2009. "The Moral Costs of Nastiness," Discussion Papers 2009-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    • Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2009-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Daniel J. Zizzo & Andrew J. Oswald, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Hideki Nakamura, 1995. "The “Spite†Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 535-560, September.
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