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Envy and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia

  • Bereket Kebede
  • Daniel John Zizzo

The underlying motivations for envy or related social preferences and their impact on agricultural innovations are examined by combining data from money burning experimental game and household survey from Ethiopia. In the first stage of the money burning experimental game, income inequality is induced by providing different endowments and playing a lottery. In the second, people are allowed to decrease (‘burn’) other players’ money at their own expense. Conditional on individual behaviour, experimentally measured envious preferences from others have a negative effect on real life agricultural innovation.

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Paper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2011-06.

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Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2011-06
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  1. Mui, V.L., 1992. "The Economics of Envy," Papers 9306, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi & Angela Sutan, 2009. "The Impact of Envy-Related Behaviors on Development," Journal of Economic Issues, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 43(3), pages 795-808, September.
  4. Daniel John Zizzo & Piers Fleming, 2009. "Social desirability, approval and public good contribution," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-11, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  5. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, 1999. "Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game," Working Papers 99-28, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Yves Breitmoser & Jonathan Tan & Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Understanding perpetual R&D races," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 445-467, September.
  7. repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
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