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Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

Author

Listed:
  • Karl Sigmund

    (Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna
    International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)

  • Hannelore De Silva

    (WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business))

  • Arne Traulsen

    (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology)

  • Christoph Hauert

    (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British ColumbiaV6T 1Z2, Canada)

Abstract

Cooperation in evolutionary games can be stabilized through punishment of non-cooperators, at a cost to those who do the punishing. Punishment can take different forms, in particular peer-punishment, in which individuals punish free-riders after the event, and pool-punishment, in which a fund for sanctioning is set up beforehand. These authors show that pool-punishment is superior to peer-punishment in dealing with second-order free-riders, who cooperate in the main game but refuse to contribute to punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl Sigmund & Hannelore De Silva & Arne Traulsen & Christoph Hauert, 2010. "Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons," Nature, Nature, vol. 466(7308), pages 861-863, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:466:y:2010:i:7308:d:10.1038_nature09203
    DOI: 10.1038/nature09203
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