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The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria

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  • MERTENS, Jean-François

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90036-R
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers RP with number 1015.

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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1015
Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 4, 553-564, 1992
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Cited by:

  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two‐Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1639-1699, 07.
  2. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
  3. Balkenborg, Dieter & Jansen, Mathijs & Vermeulen, Dries, 2001. "Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 111-130, January.
  4. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
  5. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Metastable Equilibria," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 787-820, November.
  7. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form," Research Papers 1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
  9. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2015. "On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 889-909, April.
  11. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2012. "Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2012-40, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  12. GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," CORE Discussion Papers 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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