Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games—at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria (Mertens, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this this comparison.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052|
Fax: +61)-2- 9313- 6337
Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001.
"On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
- DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, "undated". "On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1499, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October.
- MERTENS, Jean-François, "undated". "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, 1990. "The "small worlds" axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1990007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
- Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999. "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 549, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
- Buenrostro, Lucia & Dhillon, Amrita, 2004. "Scoring Rule Voting Games And Dominance Solvability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 698, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Discussion Papers 1214, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Roger B. Myerson, 2000. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0686, Econometric Society.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hongyi Li)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.