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Justification of Stable Equilibria

  • Govindan, Srihari

    (U of Iowa)

  • Wilson, Robert B.

    (Stanford U)

Two assumptions are used to justify selection of equilibria in stable sets. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to addition of redundant strategies. The other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction is interpreted as the requirement that behavior strategies in an extensive-form game are sequentially rational and conditionally admissible at every information set; viz., quasi-perfect as defined by van Damme. The strong version requires 'truly' quasi-perfect, in that every action perturbation selects a quasi-perfect equilibrium in the set. For two-player games we also provide an exact characterization of stable sets.

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File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1896.pdf
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Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1896.

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Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1896
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  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, 01.
  2. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  3. Lawrence Blume & Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 6, pages 137-160 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  4. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2001. "Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 765-69, May.
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