Assessing Strategic Risk
In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary’s choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction.
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