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Assessing Strategic Risk

  • R. J. Aumann

    ()

  • J. H. Dreze

    ()

In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary’s choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction.

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Paper provided by The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp361.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp361
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  1. Mariotti, Marco, 1995. "Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(432), pages 1099-1109, September.
  2. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  4. Joseph B. Kadane & Patrick D. Larkey, 1982. "Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 113-120, February.
  5. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 3, pages 43-57 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
  7. O'Neill, Barry, 1994. "Game theory models of peace and war," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 29, pages 995-1053 Elsevier.
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