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Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Attanasi

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Astrid Hopfensitz

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Emiliano Lorini

    (IRIT-LILaC - Logique, Interaction, Langue et Calcul - IRIT - Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Frédéric Moisan

    (CAM - University of Cambridge [Cambridge, UK], IRIT-LILaC - Logique, Interaction, Langue et Calcul - IRIT - Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse)

Abstract

We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players interact with partners from different ingroups (fellow members of their own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct questionnaires. We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group bene- ficial choices. The same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Attanasi & Astrid Hopfensitz & Emiliano Lorini & Frédéric Moisan, 2016. "Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes," Post-Print hal-01725156, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01725156
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Bronchal, Adrià, 2023. "Better the devil you know: The effects of group identity uncertainty on coordination efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 634-656.
    2. Francesca Lipari & Massimo Stella & Alberto Antonioni, 2019. "Investigating Peer and Sorting Effects within an Adaptive Multiplex Network Model," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-12, March.
    3. Daniela Grieco, 2022. "What Economists Can Learn from “The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities for Personal and Collective Success” by Jay J. Van Bavel and Dominick J. Packer," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-3, March.
    4. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 128(3), pages 311-332.
    5. Matthes, Julian & Piazolo, David, 2024. "Don’t put all your legs in one basket: Theory and evidence on coopetition in road cycling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    6. Thom, James Matthew & Afzal, Uzma & Gold, Natalie, 2022. "Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination in pure coordination games," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 284-314, March.
    7. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Miguel Ginés, 2019. "Strategic Ethics: Altruism without the Other-Regarding Confound," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 967-998.
    8. Jan Schmitz, 2019. "When Two Become One: How Group Mergers Affect Solidarity," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-42, July.
    9. Gee, Laura K. & Schreck, Michael J. & Singh, Ankriti, 2020. "From lab to field: Social distance and charitable giving in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    10. Lian Xue & Stefania Sitzia & Theodore L. Turocy, 2017. "What’s ours is ours: An experiment on the efficiency of bargaining over the fruits of joint activity," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    11. Matthes, Julian & Piazolo, David, 2024. "Don’t Put All Your Legs in One Basket: Theory and Evidence on Coopetition in Road Cycling," Working Papers 0751, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    12. Owen, Ann L. & Temesvary, Judit & Wei, Andrew, 2025. "Board of Directors’ connections, gender, and firm performance in a male-dominated industry: Evidence from U.S. banking," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    13. Renaud Foucart & Jonathan H. W. Tan, 2024. "A test of loyalty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(1), pages 109-137, August.
    14. Eric Cardella & Briggs Depew & Ryan B. Williams, 2024. "Behavioral responses of mandatory masking within social interactions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 263-285, October.
    15. Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2022. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 93-107, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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