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Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

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  • Courtois, Pierre
  • Tazdaït, Tarik

Abstract

We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Courtois, Pierre & Tazdaït, Tarik, 2007. "Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 204(3), pages 301-314.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:204:y:2007:i:3:p:301-314
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015
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    Cited by:

    1. Balint, T. & Lamperti, F. & Mandel, A. & Napoletano, M. & Roventini, A. & Sapio, A., 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 252-265.
    2. He, Shawei & Marc Kilgour, D. & Hipel, Keith W., 2017. "A general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution with application to greenhouse gas emission disputes between USA and China," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(3), pages 919-932.
    3. Hourcade, Jean-Charles & Salles, Jean-Michel & Thery, Daniel, 1992. "Ecological economics and scientific controversies. Lessons from some recent policy making in the EEC," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 211-233, December.
    4. repec:spr:ieaple:v:18:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10784-018-9406-0 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Games of influence; Climate change negotiation; Master equation; Integrated assessment modelling;

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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