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Engagement unilatéral provoqué en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux

Listed author(s):
  • Gilles Rotillon
  • Tarik Tazdaït

[eng] Provocated unilateral commitment in the presence of global environmental change In this paper which deals with international pollution, we attempt to explain why some countries other than those who are members of the O.E.C.D accept to reduce unilaterally their pollution emissions. This situation is modelised from the angle of evolutionary game dynamics since such a process allows us to describe the evolution of a polymorphic population. Thus, we demonstrate that it is sometimes more advantageous for an O.E.C.D country to encourage (by transfers) one of its partially industrialised neighbours to reduce its level of pollution emissions rather than reduce its own emissions. For this, it is necessary that the cost of cooperation should be low. It is also necessary that there should not be too many partially industrialised countries which unilaterally commit. Otherwise this would give rise to a situation where the industrial countries would adopt a free-rider attitude and would only respect part of the transfer promise. [fre] Engagement unilatéral provoqué en présence de problèmes environnementaux globaux Dans le présent article qui traite des problèmes environnementaux globaux, nous nous sommes fixés pour objectif d'expliquer pourquoi certains pays autres que ceux de l'OCDE s'engagent à coopérer unilatéralement. L'idée est que, pour un pays industrialisé, il peut être moins coûteux de financer les réductions d'un pays frontalier moyennement industrialisé que de réduire soi-même le niveau de ses propres émissions polluantes. Cette stratégie tendrait à inciter les pays moyennement industrialisés à rechercher de telles ententes, et ainsi procéder à des réductions de leurs émissions (et donc à s'engager unilatéralement). Notre réflexion s'appuiera sur une argumentation évolutionniste, le but étant de montrer que la réussite d'une telle stratégie peut favoriser des comportements d'imitation d'autres pays. Néanmoins, la portée de ce type de stratégie restera modeste, en raison de l'existence de conditions propices pour les pays industriels au non-respect de leurs engagements.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 49 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 1089-1102

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_4_410032
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