Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik
Analyzing the rationale for climate policy, one utility category is often neglected: secondary benefits. This is surprising because the consideration of secondary benefits would increase the attractiveness of climate policies from a national point of view. It would however also affect the behavior of states in international negotiations on climate protection. On the basis of a chicken game, it is argued in this article that secondary benefits support national incentives to behave cooperatively. International cooperation in climate policies thus becomes more probable. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005
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Volume (Year): 6 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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