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Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy / Sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik

Author

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  • Markandya Anil

    (Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 2AR Italy)

  • Rübbelke Dirk T.G.

    (Juniorprofessur für Europäische Wirtschaft, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Technische Universität Chemnitz, Reichenhainerstr. 39, D-09126 Chemnitz, Germany)

Abstract

The benefits of climate policy normally consist exclusively of the reduced impacts of climate change, i.e., the policy’s primary aim. Our analysis of benefits of climate policy suggests, however, that researchers and policymakers should also take account of ancillary benefits, e.g., in the shape of improved air quality induced by climate protection measures. A consideration of both, primary and ancillary benefits, has a positive influence on global climate protection efforts, e.g., because the regional impact of ancillary effects attenuates easy-riding motives of countries with respect to their provision of climate protection. In this article, we analyze the nature of ancillary benefits, present an overview of European assessment studies and explain possible methods to estimate ancillary benefits. Main differences between primary and ancillary benefits are pointed out. Furthermore, we stress the major influences of ancillary benefits on climate policy. Finally, we present one of the first models integrating primary and ancillary benefits. By this model quantitative results are calculated with respect to ancillary benefits in the UK considering different greenhouse gas (GHG) control levels. It is observed that the ancillary benefits could cover about 4 percent of the full GHG reduction cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Markandya Anil & Rübbelke Dirk T.G., 2004. "Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy / Sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 224(4), pages 488-503, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:224:y:2004:i:4:p:488-503
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2004-0406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    2. Corradini, Massimiliano & Costantini, Valeria & Mancinelli, Susanna & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2014. "Unveiling the dynamic relation between R&D and emission abatement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 48-59.
    3. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2005. "Internationale Klimaschutzverhandlungen und sekundäre Nutzen der Klimapolitik," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(3), pages 369-383, August.
    4. Marin, Giovanni & Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2009. "Emissions Trends, Labour Productivity Dynamics and Time-Related Events - Sector Heterogeneous Analyses of Decoupling/Recoupling on a 1990-2006 NAMEA," MPRA Paper 20087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Valeria Costantini & Susanna Mancinelli & Massimilano Corradini, 2011. "Environmental and Innovation Performance in a Dynamic Impure Public Good Framework," Working Papers 201117, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    6. Hubertus Bardt, 2005. "Klimaschutz und Anpassung: Merkmale unterschiedlicher Politikstrategien," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(2), pages 259-269.
    7. Pittel, Karen & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2008. "Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 210-220, December.
    8. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2019. "The Role of Social and Technical Excludability for the Success of Impure Public Good and Common Pool Agreements: The Case of International Fisheries," Graz Economics Papers 2019-12, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    9. Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020. "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    10. Michael Finus & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2008. "Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy," Working Papers 2008.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Giovanni Marin & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2009. "The dynamics of delinking in industrial emissions: The role of productivity, trade and R&D," Journal of Innovation Economics, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 91-117.
    12. Alberto Longo & David Hoyos & Anil Markandya, 2012. "Willingness to Pay for Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(1), pages 119-140, January.
    13. Endre Tvinnereim & Xiaozi Liu & Eric M. Jamelske, 2017. "Public perceptions of air pollution and climate change: different manifestations, similar causes, and concerns," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 399-412, February.
    14. Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2006. "Climate policy in developing countries and conditional transfers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1600-1610, September.
    15. Ürge-Vorsatz, Diana & Tirado Herrero, Sergio, 2012. "Building synergies between climate change mitigation and energy poverty alleviation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 83-90.
    16. Marc Daube & David Ulph, 2016. "Moral Behaviour, Altruism and Environmental Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 505-522, February.
    17. Marc Daube, 2019. "Altruism and Global Environmental Taxes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(4), pages 1049-1072, August.
    18. Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman & Alan Krupnick, 2016. "Flexibility and Stringency in Greenhouse Gas Regulations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(2), pages 225-248, February.
    19. Karen Pittel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2012. "Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 23-39, March.
    20. Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher & Anil Markandya & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2011. "The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: the Case of Climate Policy," Working Papers 2011-09, BC3.

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